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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jace Thompson challenges the district court's decision to revoke probation in his 
two cases, or alternatively, its failure to reduce those sentences sua sponte when it did 
so. In order to fully present those claims, he requested that the record on appeal be 
augmented with several relevant transcripts not initially provided with the record. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court denied his motions to augment the record with 
those transcripts, even though some of those transcripts had actually, albeit mistakenly, 
been produced and provided to appellate counsel, actually demonstrating their 
relevancy. 
As a result of those decisions, Mr. Thompson was denied the state and federal 
constitutional protections of due process and effective assistance of counsel during his 
appeal. As such, he requests that the Court hearing this appeal recognize the fact that 
his constitutional rights were violated, regardless of the entity which caused the 
violation. He also requests that, because his rights were violated, that this Court 
provide an appropriate remedy for those violations. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Cumulatively, Mr. Thompson has pled guilty to one count of eluding and two 
counts of burglary. He was sentenced to concurrent five-year unified terms, with two 
years fixed, for the eluding charge and one of the burglary charges. (R., 39515, p.49.)1 
1 Each of the two cases on appeal has its own, individually-paginated, electronic volume 
containing the record for that case. To avoid confusion, citations to those records will 
include the docket number of the case being referenced. 
1 
He was sentenced to a concurrent unified term of six years, with three years fixed, for 
the other burglary charge. (R., 39504, p.72.) 
In February 200B, Mr. Thompson was placed on probation following a successful 
period of retained jurisdiction. (R., 39515, pp.4B-50, 61-65; Addendum to Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), 39515, p.2i The underlying sentences in that 
case, Docket Number 39515 (Nez Perce County Case No. CR07 -3909), were a result of 
his plea of guilty to burglary and eluding, and were for concurrent, unified terms of five 
years, with fixed terms of two years. (R., 39515, p.49.) A probation violation was 
subsequently filed, alleging that he had absconded in April 200B. (R., 39515, p.67.) 
However, that report was withdrawn when Mr. Thompson's probation officer was 
informed that Mr. Thompson had, in fact, been incarcerated in Washington since being 
sentenced in Idaho, and so had not violated the terms of his probation. 3 (R., 39515, 
2 As with the record volumes, there are multiple electronic files containing the 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and the subsequent addendums 
(hereinafter, APSis). The original PSI report from 2007 is contained in the electronic file 
"Thompson Confidential Presentence 39515.pdf" on the CD-ROM bearing Docket 
Number 39515, and will be referred to as "PS!." It does not appear that a new PSI was 
generated in regard to Docket Number 39504, but rather, it relied on a "Special 
Progress Report" instead. (See R., pp.64-66.) Although this information is not in the 
record materials, to promote clarity, undersigned counsel represents those facts based 
on information in existence outside the record. The 200B APSI report is provided in the 
electronic file "Thompson Confidential IDOC Report 39515.pdf" on the CD-ROM bearing 
Docket Number 39515, and will be referred to as "200B APSI." The 2011 APSI report is 
provided in the electronic file "Confidential IDOC Report.pdf" on the CD-ROM bearing 
Docket Number 39504, and will referred to as "2011 APSI." Mr. Thompson also 
submitted a letter to the district court regarding the Freedom Place program. That letter, 
along with the accompanying literature about the program, is provided in the electronic 
file "Correspondence.pdf" on the CD-ROM bearing Docket Number 39504. It will be 
referred to as "Freedom Place Information." All page numbers for these documents 
refer to the electronic page number. 
3 He was sentenced in Washington on the same basic facts as he was for the eluding 
charge in Idaho. (See PSI, p.B.) The reason for that was Mr. Gillespie had driven 
across the river from Lewiston, Idaho, to Clarkson, Washington, where he was arrested 
by Washington law enforcement officers. (PSI, p.3.) 
2 
p.69.) The district court subsequently issued an amended order of probation on 
January 30, 2009. (R., 39515, pp.71-75.) Upon being released from Washington, 
Mr. Thompson began serving his period of probation in Idaho, and he complied with the 
terms of his probation. In fact, he was so successful that he was placed on 
unsupervised probation in June 2010. (R., p.79.) 
However, Mr. Thompson relapsed and was caught breaking into a school in 
October 2010. That incident not only resulted in a probation violation (R., 39515, p.81), 
but also in a new case being filed. That case, Docket No. 39504 (Nez Perce County 
Case No. CR 10-9611), resulted in Mr. Thompson pleading guilty to one count of 
burglary. (R., 39504, p.72.) Mr. Thompson was sentenced to a unified term of six 
years, with three years fixed, which was ordered to run concurrently with his sentences 
from Docket No. 39515. (R., 39504, p.72.) In addition, his probation in Docket Number 
39515 was revoked. (R., 39515, p.124.) The district court retained jurisdiction in both 
cases. (R., 39504, p.72; R., 39515, p.124.) Although the district court recommended 
that Mr. Thompson participate in the CAPP program during that period of retained 
jurisdiction, he was sent to the traditional rider program at NICI because his LSI-R score 
did not meet the eligibility requirements for the CAPP program. 4 (See, e.g., R., 39515, 
p.128.) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Thompson successfully completed the traditional rider program 
and was returned to probation. 5 (2011 APSI, p.2; R., 39504, pp.85-88; R., 39515, 
4 The CAPP program is specifically designed to present intensive treatment focused 
on substance abuse issues. Idaho Dep't of Correction, "Correctional Alternative 
Placement Program (CAPP)," http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/contentllocations/prisons/ 
correctional_alternative_placement_program. 
5 The traditional rider program at NICI, as opposed to the CAPP program, is a program 
geared toward making the participants candidates for probation. Idaho Dep't of 
Correction, "North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI)," http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/ 
3 
pp.133-36.) However, another report of probation violation was filed, alleging that 
Mr. Thompson had been drinking and attempting to unlawfully enter a business. 
(R., 39504, pp.90-91; R., 39515, pp.138-39.) According to officers, they found 
Mr. Thompson lying down in the cab of a truck, which did not belong to him, near the 
business. (Tr., p.64, LsA-21, p.68, Ls.14-22l After they had removed Mr. Thompson 
from the vehicle and handcuffed him, officers began to question him. (Tr., p.65, 
Ls.6-18; p.67, L.23 - p.68, L.2.) Mr. Thompson stated that he had been asked to leave 
by his girlfriend, was looking for a place to sleep, and had been able to get into the truck 
for that reason. (Tr., p.68, Ls.6-19.) Officers did not administer a breath test when they 
arrested Mr. Thompson. (Tr., p.69, Ls.18-21; p.78, L.22 - p.79, LA.) Officer David 
Gobbi testified at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Thompson appeared intoxicated. 
(Tr., p.68, Ls.3-6.) Officer Clinton Hoiland, Mr. Thompson's parole officer, also testified 
that Mr. Thompson had admitted to relapsing. (Tr., p.75, Ls.3-6.) As a result of that 
evidence, the district court found that a preponderance of the evidence supported both 
allegations of the report of probation violation. (Tr., p.82, L.11 - p.83, L.2.) 
At the disposition hearing, Mr. Thompson presented the district court with 
evidence that he had been accepted for housing and treatment in the Freedom Place 
content/locations/prisons/north_idaho_correctionaUnstitution. While it may have some 
substance treatment aspects, they are provided alongside various other programs, such 
as parenting classes or workplace ethics classes. (See, e.g., 2011 APSI, p.3; 2008 
APSI, p.3.) 
6 The transcripts in this case were prepared in a single volume with several individual 
transcripts. All were consecutively paginated. However, several of those transcripts 
were prepared and provided in error, as will be discussed in depth, infra. The Idaho 
Supreme Court only ordered that two of those transcripts be augmented to the record -
the November 2, 2011, admit/deny hearing, and the November 16, 2011, disposition 
hearing. (Order [granting in part motion to augment], April 12, 2012; Order [denying 
renewed motion to augment], July 9, 2012.) As a result of the mistake in preparation of 
the transcripts, the transcripts that were augmented to the record begin on page 60 
instead of page 1. 
4 
program. (Tr., p.93, Ls.20-22.) Freedom Place is a year-long live-in treatment program 
designed to help participants deal with drug and alcohol addictions. (Tr., p.87, 
L.9 - p.88, L.3; see generally Freedom Place Information, ppA-17; Tr., pp.87-98.) 
Mr. Thompson had been a driving force in the application process to Freedom Place. 
(See Tr., p.97, Ls.9-25.) Defense counsel argued that Mr. Thompson should be 
ordered to complete the Freedom Place program in lieu of revoking his probation and 
executing his sentence. (Tr., p.98, Ls.17-19.) According to Mr. Thompson, his past 
rehabilitative opportunities focused more on work ethics and job skills, as opposed to 
addressing his alcohol problems. (See, e.g., Tr., p.102, Ls.5-11.) He requested the 
opportunity to attend Freedom Place in order to specifically work on addressing those 
remaining issues. (Tr., p.1 02, Ls.18-21.) 
The district court, however, focused on the fact that Mr. Thompson had prior 
opportunities to succeed on probation and get some treatment during the periods of 
retained jurisdiction. (See generally, Tr., pp.105-109.) As a result, it decided to revoke 
Mr. Thompson's probation and execute the concurrent underlying sentences. 
(Tr., p.109, Ls.5-12.) 
Mr. Thompson subsequently filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, 
Rule 35) in each case for credit for the time he served on probation. (R., 39504, p.118; 
R., 39515, p.166.) The district court denied both of those motions. 7 (R., 39504, p.112; 
R., 39515, p.170.) Mr. Thompson timely appealed from those denials, as well as the 
decisions to revoke his probation. (R., 39504, pp.124-26; R., 39515, pp.172-74.) 
7 These denials are not challenged on appeal. 
5 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Thompson due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motions to Augment the record with various 
transcripts from the prior proceedings of his cases, and which contained 
information relevant to his appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Thompson's 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Thompson Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motions To Augment The Record With Various 
Transcripts From The Prior Proceedings Of His Cases, And Which Contained 
Information Relevant To His Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Thompson contends that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his federal 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it denied his motions to 
augment the record with transcripts of trial proceedings relevant to the issues he intends 
to raise on appeal. He also asserts that the only constitutional reason why such 
transcripts may be properly kept from the record is if the State demonstrates they are 
irrelevant to the appeal. By denying augmentation of these transcripts, the appellate 
court is unable to review the merits of the district court's decisions now challenged on 
appeal. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Thompson Due Process And Equal 
Protection In Violation Of His Constitutional Rights 
1. The Recently-Articulated Standard From The Court Of Appeals Decision 
In Morgan Is Not Applicable To Mr. Thompson's Case, And Even If It Is, 
The Record Should Have Still Been Augmented Under The Morgan 
Analysis 
The Court of Appeals recently issued a decision in State v. Morgan, which held 
that it could not review this issue and that, if it could, the defendant in that case had not 
shown that the missing transcripts were necessary to appellate review. Morgan, 
P.3d _, Docket No. 39057, at 2 (Ct. App. 2012), petition for rev. filed. This case is 
distinguishable because Mr. Thompson did demonstrate the relevancy of the missing 
transcripts. Although his motion to augment with those transcripts was denied, they 
7 
were mistakenly transcribed and provided to appellate counsel. A review of those 
transcripts revealed that they were actually, as opposed to theoretically, relevant to the 
issues on appeal. (See Renewed Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Renewed Motion), filed 
June 22, 2012.) Many of those transcripts contained information that spoke to 
mitigation. (See Renewed Motion, ppA-7.) Many others contained statements of 
allocution, which are always relevant to excessive sentence claims.8 See State v. 
Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003). Because evidence of mitigation and 
statements of allocution are relevant to a defendant's excessive sentence claim on 
appeal,9 there is relevant information in those transcripts. 
As there was relevant evidence in those transcripts, they should have been made 
part of the record on appeal. See, e.g., Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. They are relevant 
for the simple reason that a diligent district judge would review the file, as well as any 
potentially-relevant audio hearings, if he could not remember what he had heard at 
those prior hearings, in order to sufficiently consider the evidence before ruling on the 
8 In fact, the right of allocution is so important that, regardless of whether objections are 
made below, the denial of that right may be raised for the first time on appeal. Gervasi, 
138 Idaho at 816. In this case, Mr. Thompson is asserting that the district court should 
not have revoked his probation, or alternatively, should have, sua sponte, reduced his 
sentences when it did so. Primarily because of that second alternative, Gervasi 
demonstrates the need for the district court to have considered those statements of 
allocution when it made the decision to revoke. See id.; I.C. § 19-2521 (the criteria for 
deciding not to place a defendant on probation, which include the defendant's character, 
particularly his amenability to rehabilitative efforts). Those statements often provide 
insights into the defendant's character, which, in combination with new evidence, helps 
demonstrate that the sentences now being executed are excessive and should be 
reduced, if they should be executed at all. 
9 The standards governing excessive sentence claims and erroneous revocation claims 
are remarkably similar. See, e.g., State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,27 (Ct. App. 2009) 
abrogated on other grounds by Morgan, Docket No. 39057, at 3. As such, the rule 
from Gervasi - that statements of allocution are always relevant to excessive sentence 
claims - should also apply to probation revocation arguments. 
8 
sentencing issues. See, e.g., State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 574 (2011) (asserting 
that, in regard to sentencing, the district court is obligated to consider the nature and the 
character of the defendant); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(permitting the trial judge to rely on his own observations during the evolution of the 
case); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings 
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the 
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon 
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved."); 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's 
reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously 
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he 
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). As such, it is to say that that these 
prior hearings did not play a role in the district court's consideration of whether to 
relinquish jurisdiction. Therefore, as they would have been considered by Idaho's the 
district courts in their competent preparation to rule on the issues, it is necessary to 
include that information in the appellate record to review those decisions. See, e.g., 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. 
Additionally, Mr. Thompson is not asking this Court to review or overrule the 
decision the Idaho Supreme Court made in regard to the decision to augment the 
record, particularly if this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals. Rather, he is 
asserting that certain, now-final, decisions made during the appellate review process 
deprived him of certain constitutional rights during his appeal. In acknowledgment of 
the fact that those violations exist, Mr. Thompson is requesting that this Court grant him 
9 
relief. For example, in light of the deprivation of these rights, this Court could reverse 
the presumption set forth in State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999), and 
presume that the non-augmented transcripts support his claims, demonstrating that the 
district court erred in revoking probation or alternatively, not reducing Mr. Thompson's 
sentences, sua sponte, when it did so. It could also determine that because of the 
violations, Mr. Thompson's overall sentence should be reduced. 
Therefore, to the extent that Morgan may be applicable,10 it should not prevent 
this Court from affording Mr. Thompson relief for the deprivation of his constitutional 
rights, which will be demonstrated in subsections (2) and (3), infra. 
2. Mr. Thompson's Statutory Right To Appeal From The District Court's 
Order Revoking His Probation Must Comply With State And Federal 
Constitutional Due Process And Equal Protection Rights 
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant due 
process and equal protection of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I § 13. 
As articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
10 In regard to the Morgan Court's discussion of the timeframe for objections to the 
record pursuant to I.A.R. 29, the Court of Appeals has also recognized: 
Even the opportunity to file an objection under I.A.R. 29 is not the last 
opportunity for a party to request additions to the clerk's record or the 
reporter's transcript. After the record and transcript are settled pursuant to 
I.A.R. 29, a party may still request augmentation or deletions from the 
transcript or record by filing a motion with the Supreme Court pursuant to 
I.A.R. 30. 
Collins v. Collins, 130 Idaho 705, 707 n.1 (Ct. App. 1997). And while that request may 
not be afforded "of right" (see Morgan, at 3-4), the determination to deny the motion in 
the face of the demonstrated necessity of the transcripts deprived Mr. Thompson of due 
process, regardless of which procedure he chose to employ to request those 
transcripts. 
10 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham City., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998». Additionally, it has "applied the United States Supreme Court's 
standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution to 
art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare ex reI. Cab a /Ie ro , 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998) (citing Smith V. Idaho Dep't of 
Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996». These protections extend to the appellate 
process. 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. An appeal from the district court's order revoking probation is one such 
appeal. State v. Martin, 99 Idaho 781, 782 (1979); see I.A.R. 11 (c)(6). Having created 
the right to appeal, the State must provide due process and equal protection in those 
appellate proceedings. 
The United States Supreme Court has issued several rulings regarding when 
such transcripts must be provided to an indigent defendant. See, e.g., Griffin v. l!Iinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956); State V. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971). The Idaho appellate courts recognize the holdings of these cases. 
See, e.g., Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Calfaghan, 143 Idaho 856 
(Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). These cases stand for 
the principle that disparate treatment will not be tolerated under the broadly-interpreted 
due process and equal protection clauses. See, e.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18. They also 
define the standard governing the decision to order transcript production, which weighs 
in the defendant's favor. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
11 
Specifically, the procedures that are available to the courts to uphold 
this standard are governed by statute in Idaho. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); 
see also I.C.R. 5.2(a) ("[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... "); I.C.R. 54.7(a) (the district court is authorized to "order a 
transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such 
a fee as provided by statute or law."). In order to meet that standard, the defendant 
need only make a colorable argument of need to create the complete appellate record. 
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. After the defendant makes such an argument, it is the State's 
burden to prove that the requested items are not necessary to the appeal. Id. 
Mr. Thompson made the colorable request, both in his initial request to Augment 
and Suspend Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed on 
March 27, 2012 (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), as well is in his Renewed Motion. 
Both motions are incorporated herein by reference thereto. The Motion to Augment 
requested the preparation and augmentation of seven transcripts from the previous 
hearings held in these cases. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
only granted the motion in regard to two of those transcripts, and denied it as to the 
remainder. (Order [Granting In Part Motion to Augment], filed April 12, 2012.) 
However, the district court reporter erroneously prepared and provided all but 
one of the requested-but-denied transcripts. A review of those transcripts revealed that 
they were, in fact, relevant to the issues being raised on appeal. (See Renewed Motion 
to Augment, pp.2-7 (a thorough discussion of relevant portions from each of those 
transcripts).) For example, several of the transcripts contained allocution statements 
made by Mr. Thompson, himself. (See Renewed Motion to Augment, pp.5-6.) Because 
those statements are relevant to a determination on the appropriateness of a sentence 
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(see, e.g., Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816), Mr. Thompson's request to augment the record 
with those transcripts was more than a colorable claim. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
In fact, he made a clear demonstration of the relevant portions of the transcripts. 
Therefore, the burden shifted to the State to prove that the requested items were 
irrelevant to the appellate proceedings. Id. It failed to do so, sticking to its original 
objections, which were premised on State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002). (See, e.g., 
Objection to "Renewed Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Renewed Motion), pp.1-2.) 
However, Strand is distinguishable from Mr. Thompson's case. Strand addressed a 
hearing held on the defendant's motion for a reduction of sentence based on Rule 35. 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63. At that hearing, unlike in Mr. Thompson's case, the 
defendant offered no new testimony to support his motion. Id. Nor did he make a 
statement to the district court. 11 Id. The Idaho Supreme Court that, where no new 
information is provided in support of a Rule 35 motion, the district court may rely on the 
already-established record to make its decision.12 See id. at 463. Therefore, there was 
no information that counsel's arguments could provide that was not already included in 
the appellate record. Id. 
As such, the appellate court was able to review the merits of the district court's 
decision without the requested transcript. Id. And since the appellate court was able to 
make that full and complete review based on the information already in the record, the 
11 Two physical documents were submitted to the district court in Strand and were 
subsequently included in the appellate record. Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63. 
12 This is because, without any new information, the decision to deny the Rule 35 
motion is essentially the same as the original sentencing decision, and thus, if the 
original sentencing decision was within the district court's discretion, the denial of the 
Rule 35 motion would be as well, regardless of what statements counsel made at the 
Rule 35 hearing. Strand, 137 Idaho at 463. 
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defendant's rights were not violated by denying augmentation with that transcript. Id. 
However, in this case, Mr. Thompson is requesting augmentation of transcripts from 
prior hearings which are necessary to provide a full and complete record for review. 13 
See, e.g., Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28; Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74. And, as such, 
Strand is distinguishable and not controlling. 
The result is that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny the motion to 
augment the record with these relevant transcripts, it violated Mr. Thompson's due 
process and equal protection rights. As a result, this Court should fashion an 
appropriate remedy in light of that deprivation. 
3. Mr. Thompson's Is Also Entitled To Effective Assistance Of Counsel On 
Appeal 
Both the state and federal constitutions afford defendants the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, which continues during an appeal. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; see, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742-43 
(1967); Gardner, 91 Idaho at 912; Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 
1995); American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice: The Defense 
Function, Standard 4-B.3(b), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminaljustice_ 
section_archive/crimjust_standards_dfunc_blk.html#8.3 (iterating the standards for 
performance of counsel on appeal). Idaho has adopted the American Bar Association's 
standards as the starting point for determinations of whether counsel has rendered 
13 Those requested transcripts are essentially equivalent to the information the Idaho 
Supreme Court found sufficiently in the record in Strand. See Strand, 137 Idaho at 463. 
Therefore, even if Strand is applicable, it only further demonstrates the error in the 
denial of the motions to augment. 
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effective assistance. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). 
Court-appointed appellate counsel's obligations have been effectively 
summarized by the Court of Appeals: "Appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made." 
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 
742-43; Banuelos, 127 Idaho at 865; Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661 (Ct. App. 
2007). Where numerous relevant transcripts have not been included in the record an 
additional result, besides the violation of Mr. Thompson's due process and equal 
protection rights, is that he will be deprived of effective assistance of counsel. This is 
because the strength of potential arguments can be affected by the absence of the 
information in those missing transcripts. For example, certain appellate arguments are 
directed at the district court's consideration of the mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances (see Section 11(8), infra). Where evidence considered in that regard is 
only mentioned in the missing transcripts, the strength or weakness of such arguments 
cannot be fully comprehended. As such, appellate counsel will be unable to file a brief 
in support of the best arguments to be made or to advise the appellant accurately in that 
regard. See, e.g., LaBelle, 130 Idaho at 119. Thus, the result of not augmenting those 
records will be the deprivation of Mr. Thompson's right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
In this case, without the requested transcripts being made part of the record, 
counsel will be unable to file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made since 
the evidence supporting those arguments will not be included in the record, and thus 
could not be included in the briefing on direct appeal. See, e.g., State v. Yakovac, 145 
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Idaho 437, 443 (2008) ("[I]f the defendant wishes the [appellate] court to consider 
evidence outside of the record on direct appeal, she must pursue post-conviction 
relief.") As a result, continuing to deny Mr. Thompson's request to augment the record 
with these transcripts, particularly since that request is merited based on the contents of 
those transcripts which were created, deprives Mr. Thompson of his state and federal 
constitutional right to effective appellate counsel. Therefore, he should be afforded an 
appropriate remedy. For example, this Court could remand for a new sentencing 
hearing and indicate that trial counsel needs to ensure that an adequate record of the 
evidence considered at that hearing is created. Otherwise, this Court could reduce his 
sentence in recognition of the fact that his rights were deprived. 
Ultimately, the record (or rather, the piecemeal and semi-sufficient version 
provided) belies the fact that Mr. Thompson's state and federal constitutional rights 
have not been protected during the appellate process. Because of those violations, 
regardless of which entity may have caused his rights to be violated, this Court should 
craft an appropriate remedy for Mr. Thompson. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Thompson's Probation Or, 
Alternatively, By Not Reducing It Sua Sponte Pursuant To Rule 35 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court's decision to revoke his probation in 
light of his successes on probation and in the rider programs, as well as his acceptance 
into Freedom Place (a program to specifically address his ongoing struggles with 
alcohol), constitutes an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, he contends that, even if the 
district court properly determined incarceration was necessary, it still should have 
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reduced his sentences, sua sponte, because of his past successes and to give him the 
opportunity to resume his rehabilitation as soon as possible. As the district court did 
neither, it insufficiently considered the information in the record, and thus, abused its 
discretion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Thompson's Probation 
Mr. Thompson asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke 
probation and execute his unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and six 
years, with three years fixed, was an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
The decision to revoke probation is within the district court's discretion. 
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308,312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court must determine 
"whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of 
the probation is consistent with the protection of society." Id. The Legislature has 
established the criteria for determining whether probation or incarceration is merited. 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-2521). 
In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry, 
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). "The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 
(et. App. 1994); see also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007); Hanington, 148 
Idaho at 28. Accordingly, in order to show unreasonable decision-making (i.e., an 
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abuse of discretion), the defendant must show that, in light of the governing criteria and 
new evidence presented, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also 
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. To oh ill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is 
influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in 
sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, several of those 
factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the district court as it crafted 
its disposition in regard to Mr. Thompson. As a result, it did not sufficiently consider 
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whether Mr. Thompson's probation was adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or 
whether society required protection from Mr. Thompson through incarceration. 
See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
Most notably, the district court insufficiently considered Mr. Thompson's 
rehabilitative potential. The record reveals that Mr. Thompson's past rehabilitative 
programming had not focused on his alcohol abuse, but rather on his work ethic and 
skills. (See, e.g., Tr., p.1 02, Ls.5-11.) In fact, he was specifically denied the opportunity 
to participate in the CAPP program. 14 (See, e.g., R., 39515, p.12B.) Both of his prior 
periods of retained jurisdiction were at NICI, not CAPPo (See 200B APSI, p.2; 2011 
APSI, p.2.) Nevertheless, Mr. Thompson was successful in those general programs at 
NICI. (See generafly 200B APSI; 2011 APSI.) He did not receive any formal 
disciplinary reports during either of his periods of retained jurisdiction. (200B APSI, pA; 
2011 APSI, pA.) In addition, the informal reports that were filed were deemed to be 
non-serious and did not concern the APSI author. (2011 APSI, pA.) And, despite those 
missteps, he still completed the required programs, earning workplace safety 
certifications, and ultimately, recommendations for his release on probation. (Tr., p.1 02, 
Ls.B-11; 200B APSI, 1; 2011 APSI, 1.) Nonetheless, he was making his own efforts to 
14 The CAPP program is specifically designed to present intensive treatment focused 
on substance abuse issues. Idaho Dep't of Correction, "Correctional Alternative 
Placement Program (CAPP)" http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/contentllocations/prisons/ 
correctional_alternative_placement_program. While Mr. Thompson did participate in 
"A New Direction" (a program which is geared toward sUbstance abuse) during his 
period of retained jurisdiction, that was not the focus of his traditional rider program. 
(See 2011 APSI, p.3; 200B APSI, p.3.) Instead, he was also required to participate in 
several other programs not directed at substance abuse. (2011 APSI, pp.3-4; 200B 
APSI, pp.3-4.) 
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get the opportunity to engage in a program specifically designed to help address his 
substance abuse issues. (See generally Freedom Place Information.) 
Additionally, he has shown an ability to comply with the terms of probation. Once 
he was released on probation, Mr. Thompson complied with all the terms of his 
probation. He was ultimately released on probation on January 30, 2009. (See 
R., 39515, pp.71-75.) He was discharged and placed on unsupervised probation on 
June 15, 2010. (R., 39515, pp.78-79.) That means that Mr. Thompson successfully 
complied with all the terms of his probation for approximately twenty months before his 
relapse. (See R., 39515, p.75; R., 39515, p.81.) The evidence provided by 
Mr. Thompson's efforts during his period of retained jurisdiction and probation 
demonstrate his potential for rehabilitation. As rehabilitation is one of the sentencing 
objectives, the potential for rehabilitation is one of the critical characteristics the district 
court needs to sufficiently consider. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
Mr. Thompson has demonstrated that he is capable of conforming to society's 
expectations of him on release. Therefore, his track record with rehabilitation, 
particularly given the fact that he had been accepted into a program specifically 
designed to help him address the driving force underlying his behavior, should have 
indicated less of a need to incarcerate him. 
The fact that he has had prior rehabilitative opportunities does not mean that 
another opportunity to target specific issues should be foregone. The whole point of 
rehabilitation is to address all the factors that underlie a person's criminal actions, so as 
to help them learn to avoid those actions in the future, and in so doing, afford society 
more protection in the long term than any paroleable sentence of imprisonment. 
See Cook, 145 Idaho at 489 (recognizing that sentences are to be crafted so that they 
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do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once age or rehabilitation 
have decreased the risk of recidivism); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 
(Ct. App. 1988) (same). As such, foregoing such rehabilitative opportunities may 
actually undermine the primary goal of sentencing, which is the ultimate protection of 
sOciety.15 
Unfortunately, not every rehabilitative opportunity can address every potential 
issue. This means that, in order to provide optimum protection for society, rehabilitative 
opportunities should not be foreclosed. Opting for a rehabilitative alternative to 
incarceration, according to both Cook and Eubank is not only not problematic, but is, in 
fact, preferable. Better the system help a person become a reformed, productive 
member of society than just continue to imprison them. See id. In this case, the district 
court foreclosed access to a rehabilitative opportunity designed to address a specific 
underlying problem, simply because Mr. Thompson had not been perfect in his 
rehabilitative efforts. (See generally Tr., pp.1 05-1 09.) Such an approach fails to 
sufficiently consider the objective of rehabilitation. And because increased rehabilitation 
translates into increased protection for society, the district court's decision to reject 
rehabilitation also fails to sufficiently consider the paramount goal of sentencing. 
See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. That failure constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
See, e.g., id.; Cook, 145 Idaho at 489. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that such a sentence, one 
which considers rehabilitation, still addresses all the other objectives - protection of 
15 There are several other factors which support Mr. Thompson's arguments in this 
regard, but as the Idaho Supreme Court decided not to augment the record with the 
transcripts in which the relevant statements were contained (see Renewed Motion; 
Order Denying Renewed Motion), they cannot be articulated in this brief. 
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society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence. 
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still 
present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a 
sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the 
court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). In addition to restricting the 
defendant's liberty at the discretion of the Board of Corrections and the looming 
sentence, he is also deprived of several of his rights (such as the right to possess a 
firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the district court retains the ability 
to revoke the probation and execute the original sentence if Mr. Thompson were to fail 
to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, it could do so knowing that all the 
sentencing objectives properly addressed. What the probationary period provides that a 
term sentence does not is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing 
him to apply the lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 
C. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not, Sua Sponte, 
Reducing Mr. Thompson's Sentences When It Revoked His Probation 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Thompson's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing his sentence, sua sponte, 
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. When the district court decides to resume the 
execution of a previously-suspended sentence, as it does when it revokes probation, it 
also has the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. 
State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). 
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The decision to not reduce a sentence that was pronounced, but suspended, will 
be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27. The standard of review and factors considered in such a 
decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among others, 
Toohilf, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the record. 
See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should result in a more 
lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Therefore, for all the reasons discussed in Section II(B), supra, the district court 
abused its discretion by not, sua sponte, reducing Mr. Thompson's sentence, even if 
only in recognition of his successful efforts on probation to that point. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thompson respectfully requests that this Court afford him the necessary 
relief for the violations of his state and federal constitutional rights during the appellate 
process. Otherwise, he respectfully requests that the order revoking his probation and 
executing the sentences be vacated and the case remanded for a new disposition 
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